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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO
ALAN J. DAVIS, - SPECIAL,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD

CASE NO. 96-312322-CV

Plaintiff,

JUDGE SUTULA

-vsSTATE OF OHIO,

MOTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO TO
DISMISS

Defendant.
Defendant,

by and through counsel,

Stephanie Tubbs

Jones,

Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County, and Assistant Prosecuting
Attorneys, Marilyn Barkley Cassidy and Patrick J. Murphy,

hereby

moves this honorable court to dismiss the within action pursuant to
Ohio Civil Rule 12(B) (6).

The grounds for this motion are that the

Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as
is set forth more fully in the brief attached hereto and expressly
incorporat~d

herein by reference.

Respectfully submitted,
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Prosecuting
Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

Bar ley Cassidy (O
Patrick . Murphy (0002401)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorne
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Flo r
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION

Alan u·. Davis, Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel
Sheppard, through counsel, has requested the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, by way of petition, to make a determination that
he

is

a

wrongfully

incarcerated

§2305.02 and §2743.48.
Ohio Civil Rule 12

individual

pursuant

to

R. C.

The State of Ohio asserts that, pursuant to

(B) (6)

the court should dismiss the action.

The State of Ohio is entitled to dismissal by operation of the
doctrine of

laches

and

the

applicable

statutes of

limitation.

Additionally, a claim of wrongful incarceration is a personal claim
which an estate has no standing to pursue.

Finally,

any claim

which may have been lawfully asserted by Samuel Sheppard has abated
with his death, the passage of time, and his failure to pursue the
claim at or near the time of his acquittal.

FACTS

Dr.

Samuel

Sheppard was

degree on August 17,

1954,

wife, Marilyn Sheppard.

indicted for murder in the

first

in connection with the death of his

(Complaint Paragraph 1) His trial ended

with a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree on December
21,

1954,

and

imprisonment.
process,

on

January

3,

1955

he

(Complaint, paragraph 2).

was

sentenced

to

life

After a lengthy appeals

the United States Supreme Court in 1964,

reversed the

conviction and ordered a new trial based on the unfairness of the
trial and the prejudicial role of the media.
2

(Complaint, paragraph

3).

On November 16, 1966, Dr. Sheppard was subject to a re-trial

and found not g'..l.ilty of the murder.

(Complaint paragraph 4).

Dr.

Sheppard was incarcerated for nearly ten years in Ohio prisons.
(Complaint, paragraph 5).
Dr. Sheppard died on April 6, 1970. (Complaint, paragraph 6).
The action at bar was filed by the Special Administrator to the
Estate of Samuel Sheppard in October,

1995, nearly thirty years

after Dr. Sheppard's acquittal.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

A.

A MOTION TO DISMISS IS BOTH PROPER AND PERMISSIBLE WHERE
THE PLAINTIFF CAN PROVE NO SET OF FACTS ENTITLING HIM TO
RECOVERY

"Under a Civil Rule 12 (B)

( 6) motion, the court must, as a

matter of law, accept all the allegations in the complaint as true.
To grant such a motion,

it must appear beyond doubt

from the

complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling
him to recovery. "
Inc.,

Greely v.

Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs. ,
See also O'Brien v. University

(1990) 49 Ohio St. 3d 228.

Community Tenants Union,

(1975)

42 Ohio St. 2d 242 ;

(Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 followed).
In the case at bar,
entitling him to judgment.

Plaintiff

can prove

no

set of

facts

As is set forth more fully in the

following sections:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action;
The action is barred by the doctrine of laches;
The action is barred by the statute of limitations;
The action, if any, abated with the death of Samuel
Sheppard.
3

.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and the action should be
dismissed.

B.

THIS ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION IS BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF LACHES

In order to successfully prosecute a claim of

laches,

the

person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially
prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his
rights."

Smith v. Smith, 169 Ohio St. 447, 455, 156, N.E. 2d 113,

119 (1959)

The elements of laches are:

asserting a right,

delay or lapse of time in

absence of excuse for such delay,

knowledge,

actual or constructive, of injury or wrong, and prejudice to the
other party.
399,

476 N.E.

Kennedy v. City of Cleveland,
2d 683.

(1984) 16 Ohio App 3d

Delay in asserting a right does not of

itself constitute laches and in order to successfully invoke the
equitable doctrine of laches, it must be shown that the person for
whose

bencf it

the

doctrine

will

operate

has

been

prejudiced by the delay of person asserting his claim.
Corp. v'. Sixty Seven Corp,
299.

materially
Thirty Four

(1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d 350, 474 N.E. 2d.

Laches is an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable

and unexplained length of time under circumstances prejudicial to
the adverse party;

it signifies delay independent of limitations

in statutes, and it is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence.
Cunnin v. Bailey (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d. 34, 472 N.E.2d. 328.

4

·-

It is readily ascertainable from the face of the pleadings in
the case at bar, that an overwhelmingly prejudicial lapse in time
has

occurr~d

between the acquittal

filing of this claim.

of

Samuel

Sheppard and the

In the intervening thirty years since the

acquittal and the near forty two years since the crime occurred,
events

have

transpired which preclude

presenting its complete case;

the

State

of

Ohio

from

not the least of which is the death

of the individual alleged to have been wrongfully incarcerated.
(Petition,

paragraph

6).

Claimant's

representatives

conducted

witness interviews between the years 1990 and 1995; nearly thirty
years after the crime, when memories have undeniably faded.
Moreover,

prior to the enactment of R.C.

§2743.48 and R.C.

§2305.02 recourse for wrongful incarceration existed in the form of
moral claims.

Since as early as 1923, consideration was given to

a fault in the justice system which allowed an innocent individual
to fall through its grips and land in a correctional institution.
.\

"Wrongful Incarceration In Ohio:
Obligation to Compensate?

Should There be More than A Moral

12 Cap Univ. Law Rev 230.

"Inherently

defective convictions are usually initiated by witnesses/testimony
and the circumstantial evidence admitted during trial.

. .. :the

1923 court was accurate in its analysis of such occurrences as not
being

attributable

to

any

fault

in

the

law;

actually,

the

convictions are due to a mixture of human perceptive errors, not
legal ones.

These errors are consequences of variables such as a

witness

victim's

or

reactions

to

the

crime,

the

level

of

disturbance in the emotional balance of an individual in response
5

to both physical and mental stress.

Generally, the faulty convictions were not acknowledged until
the true guilty party was ascertained.

Thereupon, the legislature

may feel a moral obligation to rectify state infliction of injury
upon an individual.

Certain requirements must be met before the

legislaturP. so acted:
"First, a cause of action against the state
must not exist for the individual in a court
of law
Second there must be a moral
obligation to make amends. A moral obligation
is one which is not enforceable
by action,
but is binding on the party who has the
obligation in conscience and according to
natural justice. The obligation is viewed as a
duty which would be enforceable if not for a
rule, such as
sovereign immunity, which
exempts the party from legal liability.
The
extent to which moral obligations are to be
recognized
has
been
deemed
to
be
a
determination properly remaining in the hands
of the legislature. Finally, there must be no
dispute as to the facts of the particular
c:ase".
"Wrongful Incarceration in Ohio':
Obligation to Compensate?"

Should there Be More Than A Moral

12 Capital University Law Review 265

(1982).
Clearly Samuel Sheppard, himself, could have sought redress at
or near the time of his acquittal through the moral claims process.
He failed to do so.

Since Sheppard's demise in 1970,

only his

estate, whose standing is questionable and will be further examined
below,

is left to initiate the claim.

The petitioner has set

forth no explanation as to why no recourse has been sought until
now.

While events which have transpired over the passage of time

have materially prejudiced the State of Ohio,
6

the face

of the

pleadings reveal that Samuel Sheppard is unavailable to testify at
his own trial.

C.

Accordingly, the State's motion should be granted'.

THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The bulk of

the Wrongful

Imprisonment
However,

Chapter 2743 Court of Claims.

statute appears

R.C.

in

Section 2305.02

provides that the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction
over the first stage of the bifurcated proceeding.

Accordingly,

the general statutes of limitation contained in R.C. Chapter 2305
apply to such actions.

R.C. §2305.07

"Except as provided in sections 126. 301
and 1302. 98 of the Revised Code, an action
upon a contract not in writing, express or
implied, or upon
a liability created by
statute other than a forfeiture or penalty,
shall be brought within six years after the
11
cause thereof accrued.
R.C. §2743.48 is a remedial, not a penal statute, as at least
one court has note,

Wright v.

State,

69 Ohio App.

3d 775,

N.E.2d 1279 (1990).
"For purposes of
statutory construction,
'penal statute' is one which imposes penalty
or
creates
forfeiture,
while
'remedial
statute' is enacted to correct past defects,
to redress existing wrong, or to promote
public good..
In this regard 2743. 48 is a
remedial statute in that it addresses an
existing
wrong.
The
General
Assembly
determined that it was patently wrong to deny
a person compensation when the judicial system
failed to adequately safeguard his rights,
under the circumstances set forth in the
7

591

statute ... It does not appear the legislature
intended the remedy to penal ... "
Wright v. State, supra, at 779.

The proceeding at bar is a statutory one.

Petitioner seeks to

recover damages upon a liability created by statute.

Absent the

statute, no liability would exist on the part of the State of Ohio
by virtue of sovereign immunity. As a matter of public policy, the
legislature could not have intended that there exist no time limit
upon

an

individual's

incarceration.
forth in R.C.

right

to

seek

As a matter of law,
§2305.07 applies.

recovery

for

wrongful

the six year limitation set

The action can be said to have

accrued, most conservatively speaking, no later than the effective
date of the statute, September 24, 1986.

As the petition.er in this

action did not file until October 19, 1995, the commencement of the
action falls outside the six year limitation period of §2305.07.
R.C. §2305.09

"Four Years; certain torts
An action for any of

the following causes shall be brought

within four years after the cause thereof accrued;
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

R. C.

For trespassing upon real property;
For the recovery of personal property, or for taking or
detaining it;
For relief on the ground of fraud;
For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising
on contract nor enumerated in sections §2305.10 to
§2305.12, §2305.14 and §1304.34 of the Revised Code . .

§2305 .10

applies

to

bodily

injury

or

injury to

personal

property; §2305 .11 deals with libel, slander malicious prosecution,
8

false

imprisonment

and

malpractice;
Thus,

commercial transactions.
herein,

fall

interpretation

under

section

any

(D)

accrual

of

R.C.

of

§1304.34

applies

to

rights of the petitioner,
R.C.

yields

the

§2305.09.
date

A liberal

the

wrongful

incarceration statute became effective, September 24, 1986.

Thus,

assuming for the purpose of this motion that petitioner in fact has
a claim, the statute of limitations ran in September of 1990, and
this claim is barred.
D.

THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD LACKS STANDING TO BRING A
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION

The adoption of Ohio Constitution, Art. IV Section 4, in its
present

form

in

1968

made

justiciability

a

constitutional

requirement, expressly adopting the view which had long been taken
by the Ohio Supreme Court.

Fortner v. Thomas

(1970)

22 Ohio St.

2d. 13 (concurring opinion of Duncan, J.).
"It has been long and well established that.it
is the duty of every judicial tribunal 'to
decide actual controversies between parties
legitimately affected by specific facts and to
render judgments which can be carried into
effect.
It has become settled judicial
responsibility for courts to refrain from
giving opinions on abstract propositions and
to avoid the
imposition by judgment of
premature
declarations
or
advice
upon
potential controversies. " Fortner v. Thomas,
supra, at 13.
Even before the enactment of the constitutional requirement of
justiciability, Ohio Courts had never permitted their jurisdiction
to be invoked for the determination of abstract declarations or for
the

consideration

of

anything

other
9

than

actual

controversies

between the actual parties litigant.

For example, in Stewart v.

Southard, 17 Ohio 402 (1848), the court held:
"It is our duty to decide such questions only
as become necessary to ascertain the rights of
the parties litigant, and are legitimately
presented upon the record,
and we cannot
admit that parties have the power to call
for an opinion on a matter not thus presented,
which is
out of the case.
" Stewart,
supra, at 406.
The question of jus tertii standing has been examined most fully in

federal

courts.

As

the

Supreme Court

stated in Valley Forge

Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982):
"The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of
constitutional requirements and prudential
considerations
[A]t
an
irreducible
minimum, Art. III requires the party who
invokes the court's authority to 'show that he
personally has
suffered
some
actual
or
threatened
injury
as
a
result
of
the
'
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.'·
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91 99 (1979) , and that the injury
'fairly can be traced to the challenged action
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)
In
this manner does Article III limit the federal
judicial power 'to those disputes which
confine federal courts to a role consistent
with a system of separated powers and which
are traditionally thought to be capable of
resolution through the judicial process.'
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)
.

Thus,
factor

the standing doctrine can be organized into a three-

test:

redressability.

(1)

injury

in

fact;

(2)

causation;

and

(3)

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130,
10

3136 (1992).
In the case at bar,

factors one

(redressability) are not met.

(injury in fact)

The individual who is alleged to

have been wrongfully incarcerated is deceased.
above,

there

is

recovery in a
discussed

and three

no provision under

representative

law for

capacity.

in greater depth below,

the

As is discussed

an estate to

Moreover,
statute

at

as

seek

will

issue,

be

R. C.

§2743.48 applies only to individuals, NOT their representatives,
heirs and assigns.

Additionally,

there is no allegation in the

petition as to any injury by virtue of wrongful incarceration to
anyone except the deceased,

Samuel Sheppard.

Finally,

assuming

some injury in fact did occur to Samuel Sheppard, money damages to
the estate cannot redress those injuries.
Estate

of

Samuel

Sheppard

constitutionally requisite

has

failed

It is clear that the
to

set

forth

the

case and controversy to invoke the

jurisdiction of the court.
E.

O.R.C. §2743.48 CAN BE CONSTRUED ONLY TO AFFORD REDRESS
TO WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS, NOT THEIR HEIRS,
REPRESENTATIVES AND ASSIGNS.

The state has waived its immunity from liability and consented
to be sued in the.
which

prov~des,

Court of Claims by virtue of R.C. §2743.02 (A),

as follows:

"The state hereby waives its immunity from
liability and consents to be sued, and have
its liability determined, in the court of
claims created in this chapter in accordance
with the same rules of law applicable to suits
between private parties,
subject to the
limitations set forth in this chapter."
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The state's waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability
has not opened up the public coffers to all who may seek recompense
but, rather permits the liability of the state to be determined in
accordance

with

the

rules

of

law applicable

to

suits

between

private parties, no new claim for relief or right of action being
created by the waiver of
permits

actions

against

immunity.
the

R.C.

state

to

be

§2743.02
brought

(A)

merely

which

were

previously barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but such
actions must be predicated upon previously recognized claims for
relief,

for which the state would have been liable except

sovereign immunity.

Smith v. Wait,

for

(1975) 46 Ohio App 2d. 281 at

283.
The Court of Claims Act did not authorize a new claim allowing
a civil action against the state for wrongful imprisonment.

That

action became viable only upon the adoption of R.C. §2743.48 by the
General

Asseml?ly.
-,

R.C.

§2743.48

created

obligations of a substantive nature.

duties,

rights,

and

Smith v. Wait, supra.

The scope of remediation is clearly limited to the individual by
the statutory language.
It

is a

language of

cardinal
a

Courts do not

statute
have

rule that
itself

the

court must

to determine

authority to

ignore

first

legislative

plain

look to
intent.

and unambiguous

language of statute under guise of statutory interpretation, but
must give effect to words used;

in other words,

delete words used or insert words not used.
1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 232.

courts may not

In re Collier (Athens

In interpreting a statute words must be
12

taken

in

their

usual,

Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.

normal

or

customary

meaning.

Love

v.

(Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394.

In Ohio, the specific inclusion by the legislature of items in a
statute

implies

the

exclusion of others.

(1951) 155 Ohio St. 137, 146,

Kirsheman v.

Paulin

Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473.

See also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio St. 3d 176.
It is significant that the drafters of this legislation chose
the word

11

individual 11

•

An individual,

as defined by

Websters

Dictionary is:
1. a
2. a
3. a
being,
11

single human being, as distinguished from a group.
person.
distinct, indivisible entity; a single thing,
11
instance or item.

The use of the word individual, as opposed to the word person,
which has undergone extensive legal interpretation,

expresses a

clear, unambiguous intent to limit compensation to an individual.
Further

evidence

of

the

legislature's

intent

·\

eligibility for compensation under R.C. §2743.48
subsection (B)

to

limit

can be found in

(1) :

When a court of common pleas determines,
. that a person is a wrongfully imprisoned
individual, the court shall provide the person
with a copy of this section and orally inform
him and his attorney of his rights under this
section.
(Emphasis Added)
11

Such language demonstrates a clear contemplation that
litigant himself be present.

Moreover,

as

a

the

matter of public

policy it is logical that a remedy be available to those wrongfully
incarcerated, but that state coffers NOT be opened to the families
13

of deceased individuals who decide to pursue a claim after the
fact.

Finally,

representatives,
individuals as

had

the

heirs

legislature

and

assigns

compensable under the

wished

of

include

wrongfully

statute,

included specific language to so indicate.

to

the

imprisoned

they would have

It is not within the

authority of the court to extend clear and unambiguous language to
areas that very language

F.

was designed to exclude.

AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION ABATED WITH THE
DEATH OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD

Sectionn

§2311. 21

of

the

abatement by death of a party.

Ohio

Revised

Code

provides

for

Specifically, the section states:

"Unless otherwise provided, no action or
proceeding pending in any court shall abate by
the death of either or both of the parties
thereto, except actions for libel, slander,
malicious prosecution,
for a nuisance or
against a
judge of a county court for
misconduct in office, which shall abate by the
death of either party."
Section §2305.21, Ohio Revised Code, determines those causes
which survive and

provides:

[i]n addition to the causes of action which
survive at common law, causes of action for
mesne profits, or injuries to the person or
property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall
survive; and such actions may be brought
notwithstanding the death of the person
entitled or liable thereto."
11

"In order for an action to survive under R.C.

§2305.21,

the

action must be one for injuries to the person and that term means
physical injuries."

Village of Oakwood v. Makar, 11 Ohio App 3d
14

46,

47,

(1983).

At least one court has held

11

injuries to the

person does not encompass injuries to character or reputation:
Flynn v. Relic,

41404

(8th

District. Ohio)

An action for wrongful imprisonment,

thus,

(June 26, 1980)
is not an action for

physical injuries and does not survive pursuant to R.C. §2305.21.
Accordingly, pursuant to the "unless otherwise provided "language
in

R.C.

§~311.21,

the action is subject to abatement.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law,

the

State of Ohio respectfully requests that the court enter judgment
on its behalf.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

ri yn ~ kley Cassidy ( 014647)
Patrick lMurphy (0002401)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO
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